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The Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR), formerly known as Triana, is a unique 
mission, not because of its objectives but because of how long it was in storage before launch. 
The Triana spacecraft was built in the late 90s and later renamed as DSCOVR, but the project 
was canceled before the spacecraft was launched. The nearly-complete spacecraft was put in 
controlled storage for 10 years, until the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) provided funding for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to 
refurbish the spacecraft.. On February 11, 2015, DSCOVR was launched on a Falcon 9 v1.1 
from launch complex 40 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. This paper describes the 
DSCOVR propulsion system, which utilizes ten 4.5 N thrusters in blowdown mode to perform 
Midcourse Correction (MCC) maneuvers, Lissajous Orbit Insertion (LOI) at Lagrangian 
point L1, momentum unloading maneuvers, and station keeping delta-v maneuvers at L1. This 
paper also describes the testing that was performed, including susbsystem-level and 
spacecraft-level tests, to verify the propulsion system’s integrity for flight. Finally, this paper 
concludes with a discussion of the challenges and lessons learned during this unique mission, 
including replacement of a bent thruster and installation of an auxiliary heater over existing 
propellant line heaters.   
 
Nomenclature 
ACE  =  Advanced Composition Explorers 
ADP =  Acceptance Data Package 
DMP =  DSCOVR Manifold Panel 
DSCOVR =  Deep Space Climate Observatory 
DTM =  Dual Thruster Module 
EGSE = Electrical Ground Support Equipment 
FDM =  Fill and Drain Module 
FDV =  Fill and Drain Valve 
GSE = Ground Support Equipment 
GSFC = Goddard Space Flight Center 
ICD =  Interface Control Document 
ITOS = Integrated Test and Operations System  
L1 =   First Lagrangian Point 
LOI =   Lissajous Orbit Insertion 
MCC  =  Midcourse Correction 
MDP = Maximum Design Pressure 
MEOP = Maximum Expected Operating Pressure 
MLI =  Multilayer Insulation 
NOAA  =   National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NASA  =   National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
PCM =  Propellant Control Module 
PM  =  Propulsion Module 
PN =  Power Node 
RGA = Residual Gas Analyzer 
S/C =  Spacecraft 
SMEX = Small Explorer 
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TC =  Temperature Controller  
UHUB =  Utility HUB 
 
I. Introduction 
How often is a project repurposed after many years of operation or after a hiatus? For missions in flight, a new 
objective can be chosen if the spacecraft remains functional after the primary mission is complete.  However, this kind 
of change is a rare occurrence prior to launch.  One example is the Triana mission, which was mothballed for many 
years and resurrected as the Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR), with the priorities of the original objectives 
reversed.  
 DSCOVR is supported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA), and the United States Air Force. The mission’s primary objective is to provide 
advanced warning of solar storms and other extreme solar events. This warning will allow utility companies and 
satellite operators to take action and avoid damage to critical components.  Millions of people depend on modern 
equipment that could be greatly affected by solar events.  The secondary objective of the DSCOVR mission is to 
provide a continuous view of Earth for observing and tracking changes in the ozone, effects of aerosol usage, and 
information about cloud cover. Figure 1 shows DSCOVR on +X side, and Figure 2 shows DSCOVR on –X side. 
  
Figure 1. Deep Space Climate Observatory on +X Side 
 
Figure 2. Deep Space Climate Observatory on -X Side 
 In the late 1990s, Triana was primarily designed to provide a continuous view of the Earth in order to observe 
changes in the atmosphere and effects of modern life. Additionally, Triana would provide advanced warning of coronal 
mass ejections toward Earth.  To meet these objectives, the spacecraft consisted of a Small Explorer (SMEX)-lite 
module and a propulsion module (PM).  The SMEX-lite module includes the avionics box, four reactions wheels, 
gyro, star tracker, and structure.  The propulsion module includes the propulsion components. Triana was originally 
to be launched on a Space Shuttle. 
 The Triana project was canceled in 2001 after completion of environmental testing. The spacecraft was placed in 
a GN2-purged storage box in a controlled cleanroom environment after the project was canceled. The controlled 
cleanroom has temperature and humidity sensors. On occasion, the spacecraft was taken out of its box and checked 
inside the cleanroom. Because it was not known whether the spacecraft would eventually fly, some parts were taken 
and used for other projects. 
 NOAA requested that NASA evaluate whether the Triana spacecraft could replace the space weather data coming 
from the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE). ACE launched on August 25, 1997, and its instruments are 
beginning to show signs of degradation. Replacing ACE with DSCOVR would maintain operations as the spacecraft 
continues to age. Approval was given to remove DSCOVR from storage, with the expectation that the satellite would 
be refurbished with minimal effort. DSCOVR was taken out of storage in 2012, making this the first in-house 
spacecraft NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has refurbished after long-duration storage. 
 This paper describes the propulsion system and the testing performed to verify its integrity for flight. This paper 
also describes the challenges and lessons learned during refurbishment, testing, launch, and early flight operations. 
II. Propulsion System Overview 
A. Propulsion System 
 The DSCOVR propulsion system is a monopropellant blowdown system that consists of ten 4.5 N thrusters, one 
0.71 m spherical tank with 145 kg of hydrazine, two fill and drain valves (FDV), and Propellant Control Module 
(PCM) which includes one latch valve, two pressure transducers, one filter, and one orifice. Tubing sizes are 1/4 and 
3/8 inch. The fluid schematic is shown in Figure 3 
  
 
Figure 3. DSCOVR Propulsion Schematic 
The DSCOVR propulsion system is required to: 
 Provide propellant for five years of operation 
 Correct excessive tip-off rates after launch vehicle separation if needed  
 Provide thrust for Midcourse Correction (MCC) maneuvers and Lissajous Orbit Insertion at L1  
 Reduce the momentum built up in the reaction wheels every 30 to 40 days 
 Provide stationkeeping maneuvers at L1 
 Maintain propulsion system temperatures between 10°C and 50°C. 
 The Triana project was given a short timetable – approximately 2 years - to build the observatory. Because of the 
long lead time required for new propulsion components, several spare components were used from other projects. For 
instance, instead of procuring a new fuel tank, the spare fuel tank from the CASSINI project was transferred to the 
Triana project. This propellant tank was manufactured by Pressure Systems, Inc. (now ATK).  
  The thrusters were manufactured by Kasier Marquardt (now Moog).  Eight of the 4.5 N thrusters were 
manufactured as dual thruster modules (DTM) with the nozzles oriented 45 degrees opposite each other in the Z 
direction. The DTM contains two 4.5 N thrusters, a connector, and temperature controller. The DTMs provide attitude 
control during delta-V, momentum unloading, and contingency delta-V burns in +Z, -Z, +X, and -X directions. Two 
4.5 N thrusters are mounted on the aft end of DSCOVR to provide thrust in the +Z direction.  These axial thrusters 
are more efficient for delta-V burns and stationkeeping at L1.   
 Two FDVs were provided by the Cassini project. A 1/4 inch valve for the gas side and a 3/8 inch valve for the 
liquid side. These valves were manufactured by OEA Aerospace (now Cobham Life Support).   
 The pressure transducers were provided by the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) project. The transducers 
were manufactured by Paine Corporation (now Paine Electronics).  Each transducer has a full scale of 0-500 psia. The 
second pressure transducer was added late in the Triana project to satisfy fault tolerance requirements from Shuttle 
safety. The pressure transducers are wired to the Safety Inhibit Unit to preclude overheating in the PCM.  
 The 1/4 inch latch valve was manufactured by VACCO. The valve remains magnetically latched in position until 
it is commanded to change states. The function of the latch valve is two-fold. The latch valve is one of three mechanical 
inhibits required by Range Safety AFSPCMAN 91-710 Volume 3. Also, the latch valve isolates the entire thruster 
manifold if any of the thrusters leak.   
 
B. Mechanical Design 
 As shown in Figure 4, the propulsion components and lines are mounted inside an aluminum cylindrical structure 
that interfaces with the SMEX bus. Each DTM is mounted on brackets at the top of the cylindrical structure. Two 
axial thrusters are mounted on the bottom of the deck. The locations of all 10 thrusters are shown in Figure 4 and 
Figure 5. The propellant lines are supported by standoffs which are bonded to the deck and structure. The PCM is 
mounted on a plate, which is mounted onto the deck inside the cylinder as shown in Figure 6. 
  
Figure 4. Propulsion Module 
 
  
Figure 5. Axial Thrusters and Prop Line Zone 5 
  
Figure 6. Propulsion Control Module 
C. Electrical Design 
 As shown in Figure 7, the thrusters, latch valve, and pressure transducers receive power from the Power Node 
(PN) electrical box via the Utility HUB (UHUB) electrical box.  The PN also provides power to the line heaters, tank 
heaters, and thruster valve and catalyst bed heaters When a command to fire a thruster is received in the UHUB, the 
UHUB switches the power to the thrusters. Upon completion of firing, the UHUB removes power from the thruster 
valve, which in turn closes it. Likewise, the latch valve is actuated and the pressure transducers are turned on when a 
command is received in the UHUB to turn on these components. In addition, the UHUB receives analog data for the 
latch valve position, tank pressure, and propulsion module temperatures (propellant lines, PCM, FDV, tank, thruster 
valves).  
 Figure 7. Propulsion Electrical Interface Schematic 
D. Thermal Design 
 All components in contact with the propellant have redundant heater circuits to ensure the propellant temperature 
is above 10°C. (Hydrazine will freeze if the bulk liquid temperature drops below 2°C.)  A minimum operating 
temperature of 10°C was chosen to account for temperature variations within the system and to allow for some margin 
above the freezing point of hydrazine. All heater circuits are active whenever heater bus power is applied. In order to 
satisfy the Shuttle requirement for two fault tolerance, each heater circuit has three separate thermal control devices 
to prevent thermal runaway. For example, the tank heater and PCM heater have three redundant mechanical 
thermostats. The line heaters and thruster valve heaters have two separate temperature controllers and one over-temp 
thermostat. The line heaters are grouped in five zones, resulting in five redundant heater circuits.  Table 1 shows the 
setpoints for the flight thermostats and temperature controllers.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Setpoints for Thermal Components 
Heater Circuit Primary Setpoints 
Tank 15oC ON/ 20oC OFF 
 
PCM 10oC ON/ 20oC OFF 
Propulsion Zone 5 Auxiliary 10oC ON/ 15oC OFF 
Propulsion Line (Five Zones) 18.0oC ON/ 19.6oC OFF 
 
Thrusters 18.0oC ON/ 19.6oC OFF 
 
 As mentioned above, the Temperature Controller (TC) is one of three separate thermal devices that regulate heat 
and prevent thermal runway. The Translogic Inc. Dual Trip TC is equivalent to two mechanical thermostats. The TC 
uses two thermistor temperature inputs that are continuously validated by two active circuits which in turn control the 
heaters.  The primary purpose of the TC is to maintain the temperature of the propellant lines within the defined limits. 
The controller has two features:   
 
1. Cycle heater power ON and OFF based on the feedback from dedicated thermistors (resistance 
measurements)  
2. Check the thermistor readings to look for shorts (low resistance) or open readings (high resistance)  
 
 The controller has setpoints as specified in Table 1 to cycle the heaters. Power is not applied to the heaters until 
both the “switches” in the TC close.  The result of this configuration is that the TC will control about the lowest – 
primary – setpoint and therefore use the lowest overall power. The TC also evaluates the thermistor resistances.  If the 
values are outside the operating range (< -49°C or > 29.5°C), the TC will not operate, resulting in a fail safe. The 
digital logic utilizes an “AND” gate that requires both the resistance/temperature to be within the required control 
range and within the overall allowable range.  If either of these conditions is not true, the TC will not operate. In 
addition, there is a high temperature mechanical thermostat with a setpoint of 28.9°C on the return leg of each heater. 
This thermostat is set to prevent overheating and was necessary to meet the Triana dual-fault tolerant requirement for 
the Space Shuttle. 
 All components are covered by multi-layer insulation (MLI) blankets to minimize heat loss, thus reducing the 
required heater power to maintain the minimum temperature.  All MLI is grounded to the structure to eliminate floating 
charge over the blankets. 
III. Propulsion System Testing 
 The PM was fully built and tested during the Triana project lifetime. The Triana team was given a shortened 
schedule to build the PM. PM integration and testing took place in 1999 and 2000, followed by spacecraft-level 
environmental testing in 2001. The PCM was assembled separately; the latch valve, pressure transducers, and filter 
were installed in place on the PCM plate, and the interconnecting manifold tubing was welded to the components. The 
PCM was installed into the PM structure on the lower deck after completion. The FDVs were installed on the PM 
structure, and the thrusters were installed and aligned before the interconnecting manifolds of stainless steel tubing 
were welded together in place. All welds were x-rayed after completion. After manifold proof and leak testing, thermal 
hardware was installed on the lines and PCM. Finally, the fuel tank, with its thermal hardware already installed, was 
integrated and welded into the system. Once complete, the PM underwent a test program that included a system proof 
and leak test at 675 psia (1.5 x maximum design pressure), and component and system-level functional and leak 
testing. Typically, a propulsion system is tested at a maximum expected operating pressure (MEOP) that is based on 
tank design. However, the propulsion system was designed to satisfy the requirements which envelopes all worse-case 
hot orbit and abort conditions. For all testing, the tank’s maximum design pressure (MDP) is 450 psia at 58°C. All 
analyses for blowdown and propellant budget use the system MEOP which is 400 psia at 40°C. 
When the DSCOVR project began, the Propulsion Team determined that functional, leak, and command 
verification testing should be repeated on the propulsion module to verify the integrity of the system. Because there 
were no indications that anything had changed in the system and because the tank is cycle-limited, proof testing was 
unnecessary. Discussions about a proof test were re-opened after the bent thruster issue addressed later in this paper, 
but ultimately the decision was to test the repair weld to MDP and write a waiver for not performing a proof test of 
the rework. The waiver was approved by Range Safety. Descriptions of the testing performed on the DSCOVR 
propulsion system are below. 
 
A. Functional and leak testing 
The DSCOVR functional and leak testing procedure was based on the Triana testing procedure and incorporated 
lessons learned from other in-house propulsion systems built by the GSFC Propulsion Branch. This test was performed 
three times: 1) after the observatory was removed from storage, 2) after observatory-level environmental testing, and 
3) at the launch site prior to propellant loading. Initial testing was performed in two parts, as the first dolly used to 
support the spacecraft did not allow access to the axial thrusters. Functional and leakage testing of the axial thrusters 
was performed separately at a later date. A special partial test was also added to check the repaired thruster module 
after welding. Important dates from the integration and test schedule are shown below. 
 January 2012 – DSCOVR spacecraft removed from storage 
 August 2012 – Functional and leak testing, not including axial thrusters 
 January 2013 – Functional and leak testing, axial thrusters only 
 May 2013 – Bent thruster repair 
 August 2013 – Functional and leak test on repaired thrusters only 
 August 2013 – Reintegration of the PM with the SMEX bus 
 December 2013 through May 2014 – Spacecraft-level environmental testing 
 July 2014 – Post-environments propulsion functional and leak testing 
 December 2014 – Pre-fueling functional and leak testing 
 
The functional and leak test procedure follows the timeline shown in Figure 8. Functional and Leak Testing 
Timeline 
 
Figure 8. Functional and Leak Testing Timeline 
 
Note, however, that for the final functional and leak test prior to propellant loading, the low pressure valve and 
diaphragm leakage testing was performed prior to pressurization. This rearrangement was utilized to take advantage 
of available schedule time but avoid facility restrictions of performing high pressure testing during normal business 
hours. The included tests are described below. 
 Pressure transducer calibration – Telemetry readings are taken approximately every 25 psid from pad 
pressure (25 psia) to MDP (450 psia) and compared to analog pressure gauge readings. 
 Valve seat internal leakage testing – The fill and drain valve primary seats, secondary caps, and secondary 
O-ring seals are tested for helium leakage at MDP. A modified cap is used to isolate potential O-ring leakage 
when the primary seat is open and the AN cap is installed. This special test is described in detail in the 
Lessons Learned section of this paper. The latch valve seat, upstream and downstream thruster valve seats 
are tested for helium leakage at MDP and at pad pressure.  
 Gas flow impedance testing – The gas flow rate through each thruster is measured at a known pressure 
differential. Note that during the initial DSCOVR functional and leak test, gas flow impedance testing was 
not performed. The risk of not performing this test, which results in information-only data, was accepted. 
After the bent thruster replacement was completed, this test was included in the sequence as an additional 
verification of the health of the thrusters. 
 Diaphragm leakage testing – The helium leakage rate across the tank diaphragm is measured with the 
diaphragm bottomed out on the fuel side of the tank and the gas side of the tank filled with helium. 
 
 Major constraints for the functional and leakage testing are as follows. 
 Maintain tank surface temperature below 35°C. Pressurization to MDP causes the tank temperature to rise, 
so this constraint results in a lengthy pressurization process. 
 Maintain tank surface temperature above the ambient dew point temperature with a margin of 5°C. 
Depressurization from MDP to pad pressure causes the tank temperature to drop, so this constraint results in 
a lengthy depressurization process. This constraint is also highly dependent on the testing environment. For 
example, performing the test in a hot, humid location during the summer months, in a less-than-ideal clean 
tent, extends the duration of depressurization much further than performing the test in the drier winter months. 
 Verify that test gases entering the propulsion system has a dew point less than -51°C. Dew point is checked 
at the point of use prior to connecting to the propulsion system to check that both the supply gas and the 
ground support equipment (GSE) are sufficiently dry. 
 Maintain less than 50 psid across the tank diaphragm from the gas side to the liquid side to avoid damaging 
the elastomeric diaphragm. 
 Maintain less than 1 psid across the tank diaphragm from the liquid side to the gas side. The diaphragm in 
the DSCOVR tank is not fully reversible, so pressure differences in the reverse direction could have adverse 
effects on the diaphragm. 
The equipment setup for the functional and leak test is shown in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. Functional and Leak Testing Equipment Setup 
 
The pressurization panel used for testing has been used for previous missions built in-house. Gauge calibration 
was kept up-to-date for DSCOVR work. The test setup includes a smaller manifold panel, the DSCOVR Manifold 
Panel (DMP) that is used to direct helium into the gas or liquid side of the tank, or both, as needed for testing. The 
DMP also includes gauges to read the pressure on each side of the diaphragm. A 0.5 micron gas filter is built into the 
DMP. By opening VP1 and VP2, with VP3 and VP4 closed, the helium will flow through the filter before entering 
the flight system for pressurization. However, the filter creates a large pressure drop. For depressurization, VP3 and 
VP4 are opened and VP1 and VP2 are closed, allowing the gas flowing out of the flight system to bypass the filter so 
depressurization can occur faster. 
An electrical ground support equipment (EGSE) panel was built for DSCOVR propulsion to actuate the flight 
component during testing. This panel, shown in Figure 10, accesses the propulsion components through the propulsion 
test connector and the thruster enable connector, located next to the fill and drain valves. The EGSE capabilities are 
as follows. 
 Actuate upstream, downstream, or both thruster valve seats on any of the 10 thrusters. The thruster valve 
seats can be actuated using adjustable voltage, which allows the user to reduce to hold-open voltage to 
protect the valve coils. 
 Actuate primary or redundant coils for the latch valve to open or close the valve. 
 Read latch valve status without powering the valve. This was an important safety control for use during 
propellant loading so that the state of the latch valve could be verified without the possibility of 
inadvertently opening the valve and allowing hydrazine to flow into the thruster manifolds. 
 Power both pressure transducers at nominal voltage. 
 Display tank pressure readings in psia and in volts from both the primary and redundant pressure 
transducers. 
 Display thruster valve coil current upon actuation. 
 Display temperature readings for the propellant tank from two GSE thermistors, one located on the gas 
side of the tank and the other located on the propellant side of the tank. 
 Allow for electrical traces of the thruster valves and latch valve using a current probe. 
 
 
Figure 10. EGSE Panel 
 
B. Command Verification Testing 
Command verification testing was performed as part of re-integrating the SMEX bus and the propulsion module, 
prior to shipping to the launch site, and in conjunction with the post-shipping functional and leak tests at the launch 
site prior to propellant loading. This test verifies the integrity of the electrical command paths for each component. 
The first test included capturing electrical traces for valve seat opening and closing to verify response time 
requirements after integration. The testing performed post-environments and post-shipping commanded valve seat 
opening and closing using spacecraft ground commands. This testing requires that the thruster and latch valve enable 
plugs are installed. Command verification testing includes the following events. 
 Tank pressure is monitored using spacecraft telemetry and strip charts. Command verification testing is 
only performed at pad pressure and does not include pressurization or depressurization. However, the pad 
pressure in the system is monitored to verify no significant, unexpected changes. 
 Latch valve commands are verified by sending manual commands to open and close the latch valve. Both 
the primary and redundant coils are used, and the latch valve opening and closing commands are repeated 
using propulsion power bus A only, propulsion power bus B only, and both propulsion power buses, 
which is the nominal configuration during flight. Latch valve actuations are verified through spacecraft 
telemetry and an acoustic check. 
 Thruster valve commands are verified by sending manual commands to fire each thruster for 50 ms.  
These commands are sent from the ground to the UHUB via the 1553 bus. The UHUB switches the 
appropriate relays to send power to both the upstream and downstream thruster valve seats simultaneously 
for 50 ms, and then removes power from the thruster valves to close them. Before sending each command, 
an inflatable nitrile nozzle cover is installed on each thruster. When the command is sent to actuate the 
thruster, the cover is disturbed by the gaseous helium flowing out of the system, allowing the test 
conductor to verify correct thruster actuation. Because covers are installed on all 10 thrusters during the 
entire test, the team can verify that only the correct thruster has fired. 
 
C. Environmental Testing 
Environmental tests were repeated on the Observatory. The change in launch vehicle from the Space Shuttle to a 
SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket also meant that the spacecraft needed to be tested with different dynamic loads than it had 
seen previously. The environmental testing program included electromagnetic interference and compatibility, thermal 
vacuum and balance, acoustics, vibration, and separation/shock testing, in the order listed. This order is atypical for 
most spacecraft. Thermal vacuum testing was completed before vibration testing because of hardware availability and 
analysis results constraints from the launch vehicle provider. Four cycles for thermal vacuum testing were completed, 
followed by thermal balance testing in order to minimize chamber break time. Additional changes to the order of 
planned testing were necessitated by facility availability and schedule coordination with other in-house projects. 
For vibration testing, a fluid in the propellant tank or mass simulator for the propellant was not necessary to 
simulate propellant mass. Instead, the helium previously in the system was replaced with argon at a pad pressure of 
30 psia because the cryopumps in the thermal vacuum chamber cannot process helium. Special propulsion command 
testing performed during thermal vacuum and balance testing pulsed each thruster, thus releasing some gas into the 
chamber. The following tests were performed at both hot and cold plateaus: 
 Both pressure transducers were powered to verify tank pressures and to meet the requirement for 
continuous powered usage before flight. 
 Each of the catalyst bed primary and redundant heaters was powered on until the catalyst beds reached 
the desired minimum temperature for thruster firing. There is a high risk of catalyst poisoning if the catbed 
heaters are turned on in air, so this test can only be performed in a vacuum environment. This test also 
allowed for verification of the catalyst bed safing script that closes the latch valve in the event that 
unexpected temperature rises are seen in the catalyst beds, indicating a possible thruster leak during flight. 
In addition, the catalyst temperature rates were characterized at both nominal and low bus voltages. 
 Each thruster was actuated for 50 ms. Thruster actuations allowed some argon gas to flow into the 
chamber, which was read by the Residual Gas Analyzer (RGA). The RGA provides an alert if any gas is 
introduced into the chamber, so the RGA notification that argon was released provided verification that 
a thruster had fired. In addition, a second verification was provided by the chamber pressure monitoring 
system, which alerted operators of the rise in pressure after a thruster firing. 
 
D. Fill and Drain Valve O-Rings 
After DSCOVR was taken out of extended storage, the shelf life of all parts on the PM and whether there was any 
concern about materials’ age needed to be determined. The Propulsion Team then needed to determine whether special 
tests needed to be performed to verify the integrity of these materials. The FDVs contain O-rings made of kalrez, 
which act as secondary seals when the primary valve seat is open. The caps and the primary seat remained fully closed 
and torqued during storage, so the integrity of the O-rings after opening the valves and decompressing the seals was 
unknown. Leakage across the O-rings would be a safety concern during fueling operations. 
The Propulsion Team held several conversations with the vendor who now holds the design for the FDVs on the 
DSCOVR spacecraft. Ultimately, the exact age of these specific O-rings could not be determined, but documentation 
and papers that were found indicated a possible shelf life of 15-20 years, which was a concern because of the age of 
the spacecraft. 
In order to determine the integrity of the O-rings, a special test was included in the propulsion functional and leak 
test sequence. Propulsion technicians installed a test port in external caps that fit the fill and drain valves. The special 
test caps are shown in Figure 11. During testing, the secondary AN cap was installed on each FDV, and the primary 
valve seat on each valve was opened. The test caps were torqued onto the fill and drain valves, and a helium leak 
detector was installed on the test port located in each cap. These caps isolated the secondary cap and seals in order to 
check for leakage through the O-rings. 
Each time propulsion functional and leak testing was completed, this special test was performed. The O-ring seals 
did not show any leakage, so the integrity of the seals was intact. 
 
 
Figure 11. Special Test Caps 
IV. Launch Activities and Early Operations 
 A team contracted from Jacobs loaded DSCOVR with 145 kg of hydrazine at Astrotech Space Operations on 
January 11, 2015. The propellant lines downstream of the latch valve had been filled with 25 psia of helium after the 
final functional and leak test in December 2014. The latch valve was closed at the end of testing, so after loading the 
propellant lines were wet to the latch valve and dry between the latch valve and thrusters. The tank was pressurized 
to 354 psia at 22°C with helium. The system was monitored for 24 hours for any hydrazine decomposition and leaks.   
 On February 11, 2015 at 6:04 PM EST, DSCOVR was launched on a Falcon 9 v1.1 from launch complex 40 at 
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station.  DSCOVR separation occurred approximately 36 minutes after launch. 
Approximately 3 hours after launch, the propulsion power buses were turned on. Pressure transducer #2 was turned 
on first to verify tank pressure. Then, pressure transducer #2 was turned off and pressure transducer #1 was turned on. 
The tank pressure reading was nominal.  
 Propulsion checkout occurred approximately 16 hours after launch. The propulsion checkout serves three 
purposes. The first objective is to open the latch valve to prime propellant lines with fuel.  The second objective is to 
purge helium from the lines by pulsing each thruster for 50 ms.  The third objective is to verify each thruster works as 
expected by observing spacecraft momentum changes in the X, Y, and Z directions in response to each thruster pulse. 
The nominal plan included only one pulse per thruster. However, during the checkout process, three of the ten thrusters 
fired but did not produce enough change in spacecraft momentum to determine their performance. The team concluded 
that helium was still in these propellant lines. After several 50 ms pulses, these three thrusters imparted the expected 
torques on the DSCOVR spacecraft.   
 The first planned thruster maneuver was the MCC burn, which was designed to correct any launch dispersion in 
the spacecraft trajectory. Since the Falcon 9 trajectory resulted in a low launch dispersion, the MCC #1 burn only 
required a burn duration of 37 seconds (0.4895 m/s). The maneuver was performed successfully 32 hours after launch. 
The original maneuver plan used Thrusters 1, 2, 3, and 4 for –X delta- V direction and Thrusters 1 through 8 for 
attitude control because of concern about thruster plume heating the spacecraft boom. The MCC #1 maneuver was 
actually performed using Thrusters 9 and 10 for +Z delta-V direction and Thrusters 1 through 8 for attitude control. 
Plume analysis completed prior to the burn concluded that heating on the boom was not a concern. MCC #2 was 
performed on April 28, 2015, as a +Z maneuver with a burn duration of 3.1 minutes (about 2.449 m/s).  
 Momentum unloading is performed every 30 to 40 days to reduce the momentum built up in the reaction wheels.  
As of June 8th 2015, five momentum unloading maneuvers have been performed. These thruster burns used thrusters 
1 through 8 in pulse mode, and the burn duration for each maneuver was approximately 45 seconds. 
 On June 7, 2015 (115 days after launch), the Lissajous Orbit Insertion (LOI) burn placed DSCOVR in orbit at the 
Sun-Earth L1 Lagrangian point. The burn consisted of two segments: one burn approximately 4 hours long (152.4 
m/s) and a second burn approximately 35 minutes long (13.9 m/s). The burn was performed in two segments so the 
Flight Dynamics team could re-calibrate the second segment based on the information from the first segment. The 
thruster configuration used Thrusters 9 and 10 for +Z delta-V and the Thrusters 1 through 8 as needed for attitude 
control.   
V. Issues and Lesson Learned 
 Since the propulsion system was already built and tested in the 1990s, many challenges arose when refurbishing 
the system for use as described below.   
1. Missing Documentation 
 The Thruster Acceptance Data Package (ADP) and UHUB Interface Control Documents (ICD) were missing.  The 
thruster vendor was contacted for a copy of the Thruster ADPs. Fortunately, a copy was found for each of the 10 
thrusters. The UHUB ICD is an electrical drawing of the UHUB, which is the electronic box that provides power to 
and receives telemetry from the propulsion components. Unfortunately, the latest version of the UHUB ICD was not 
found.  Instead, other documents were used to understand the grounding of the pressure transducers as explained in 
Section V.3. Several other documents not related to the propulsion system were missing too. The original database 
containing the electronic Triana files was erased because of a hardware malfunction. The lesson learned from these 
issues is to keep all important documentation, even if the project is shut down and place electronic copies in well-
protected and backed-up databases.  
2. FDV Seals 
 Even though the pressure in the tank remained stable for many years in storage, the seals in the fill and drain valves 
needed to be checked for loss of elastomeric properties. This required a special test to check the leakage of the O-rings 
in the fill and drain valves, which is described in Section III.D.  
3. Pressure Transducer Readings 
During functional testing, the pressure transducers readings were slightly different from each other.  An initial 
investigation determined that the pressure transducers were grounded to different points on the spacecraft. The 
spacecraft drawings did not show the grounding path for one of the transducers.  After several months of work and 
investigation, a ground wire to the chassis was noticed in a recent spacecraft picture. This wire was not shown in any 
spacecraft drawing.  The ground wire for one of the pressure transducers was wired to connector P1421 (reference 
Figure 7), whereas the ground wire for the other pressure transducer is wired to the UHUB circuit board. As a result, 
two ground locations created the difference in the pressure transducer readings by a few psi. 
4. Bent Thruster 
 In April 2013, while a Propulsion Team member was labeling pictures of the propulsion module with desired 
thermocouple locations for thermal vacuum testing, the nozzle for Thruster 4 appeared to be pointing in a different 
direction than its counterparts on the other DTM; Thruster 4 should have been pointing downward. Figure 12 shows 
the bent thruster at the bottom. Inspection of the thruster showed that it was bent at the thermal standoff near the 
bracket, behind the high temperature blanket on the module. The nozzle of Thruster 4 also had a slight dent at the top.  
 
Figure 12. Bent Thruster 
The Propulsion Team met immediately with the DSCOVR failure review board to discuss their findings. The other 
nine thrusters were checked for visible damage, and none was found. The team investigated all paperwork and pictures 
to try to determine what had happened. An official Mishap Investigation Board was formed as well and completed an 
official investigation of paperwork, pictures, and interviews with personnel. 
A plan with two options was presented to the DSCOVR failure board review. The first option was to replace the 
DTM with the damaged thruster with the spare DTM.  This effort was less invasive because it replaced the damaged 
hardware with a complete spare module and did not require extensive work such as removing the damaged thruster 
and rewiring the harness. The second option was to remove the damaged parts downstream of the thruster valves. This 
effort would not require breaking the integrity of the propulsion system because the thrust chambers are bolted to the 
thruster valves.  However, replacing the parts downstream of the thruster valves  would have a risk of changing the 
thruster characteristics such as thrust level and catalyst heater profile. The failure review board concurred with the 
first option to replace the damaged DTM with the spare DTM. Because of schedule constraints for reintegrating the 
PM with the SMEX-lite bus, project management gave the Propulsion Team one month to complete the rework. 
The spare DTM was removed from propulsion storage, and its condition was fully verified to be acceptable for 
flight use. Procedures were written for the rework and evaluated by the propulsion branch. The damaged DTM was 
cut out of the system and replaced in May 2013. The Propulsion Team was able to install the spare DTM with only 
one cut and one weld. The new weld was inspected by x-ray and found to be free of any defects.  
The completed rework was followed by a functional and leak test at tank MDP for those two thrusters only in 
August 2013. Range Safety requires proof testing of all propulsion systems. However, the manifold containing the 
repair could not be tested to the manifold proof pressure or tank proof pressure because it would have reduce the 
number of proof cycles of the tank. Instead, Range Safety approved the wavier with the following conditions: 1) 
pressurize the system to MDP and perform a leak test and 2) the lines downstream of the latch valve will be free of 
propellant until after spacecraft separation from the launch vehicle.   
The official Mishap Investigation Board presented their final report in July 2013. The board could not determine 
when the damage occurred and did not find a specific root cause. The board presented three recommendations, which 
are also lessons learned: 
 Track the removal and installation of the thruster covers in a log. 
 Keep more consistent photographic evidence of the state of the spacecraft before and after major events. 
 Define visual inspection requirements for the subsystem. A full visual inspection of the spacecraft, with 
all covers removed, was not performed after DSCOVR was taken out of storage. A more detailed 
inspection may have provided earlier evidence of thruster damage, allowing for more room in the 
schedule to replace it. 
 Perform an alignment check at the beginning of the project (January 2012) 
5. Plume Impingement 
 In 2014, an independent analysis of plume impingement on the magnetometer boom was performed by the GSFC 
Propulsion Branch. The original plume analysis was performed by the Contamination Control Branch for Triana in 
1999. The updated analysis showed that heating imparted by Thrusters 5 and 7 on the deployed boom was 6070 W/m2. 
(This is much higher than the 880 W/m2 shown in the 1999 analysis.) Figure 13 shows DSCOVR with the deployed 
boom. There were three differences between the two analyses that contributed to the discrepancy in the results.  First, 
the original analysis used a simplified model of the boom geometry that only included the three longerons that run 
down the length of the boom. It did not include any of the cross-pieces. Figure 14 shows the structure of the boom. 
Second, the clocking of the boom was changed from Triana to DSCOVR, which impacted the distances between the 
longerons and the thrusters.  Third, the plume models treat the spreading of the plume differently, resulting in different 
results at the angles of interest for the boom.  The thermal analysis showed that the 6070 W/m2 heat flux would cause 
parts of the boom to exceed their 70°C temperature limit.  Because of this concern, the GSFC Propulsion Branch 
conducted additional analyses using a more accurate plume modeling approach and a refined model of the boom. At 
the same time, the Contamination Control Branch updated their analysis to correct the clocking of the boom.  The 
updated results showed good agreement of 1200 and 1400 W/m2 heat flux on the boom longerons for the Propulsion 
Branch and Contamination Control Branch analyses, respectively. However, the maximum heat flux from the 
Propulsion Branch analysis was not on the longerons but on the battens that were not included in the Contamination 
Control Branch's analysis.  This maximum heat flux was 2800 W/m2 and still posed a concern for exceeding the 
temperature limit of 70°C.  Therefore, testing was conducted by the boom vendor on spare boom material to show 
that the boom could tolerate a temperature of 102°C.  With this new temperature limit, Thrusters 5 and 7 can be used 
without overheating the boom, although some on-time/off-time restrictions are needed in certain thruster failure 
scenarios.  The lesson learned is to re-verify the assumptions of original analyses at the beginning of a refurbishment 
project like DSCOVR. 
 Figure 13. DSCOVR with the Deployed Boom 
 
Figure 14. Structure of the Boom 
6. Propulsion Line 5 Heater 
 During thermal vacuum and balance testing, one propulsion line zone temperature dropped as low as 1.9°C, which 
is below the freezing point of hydrazine (2°C). Zone 5 is located on the aft end of the spacecraft, between the two 
axial thrusters, as shown in Figure 5. This thermal zone overall was cooler than expected during testing, and a review 
of the data showed that similar behavior was seen in this zone during Triana thermal vacuum and balance testing. 
Additionally, the original thermal design assumed solar heating affected the axial thrusters and this propellant line.  
The retesting profile assumed no solar heating on the aft end of the spacecraft, which is more flight-like. 
 The DSCOVR Thermal Team determined that an auxiliary heater and thermostats should be installed on this 
propulsion line to prevent freezing any hydrazine in that line. The setpoints of the new thermostats are 10°C ON/15°C 
OFF. Because of the maturity of the spacecraft and accessibility issues with electrical harnessing, the auxiliary heater 
and thermostats needed to be installed over the existing thermal hardware. This plan is unusual for spacecraft and 
carried a risk of damaging the existing thermal hardware, which was still expected to be used in flight. The propulsion 
team created a mockup tube of the same dimensions as the flight tube for the Thermal Team to use in their testing. 
Thermal hardware was installed on the mockup tube to verify that installing thermostats over the older thermal 
hardware would not damage the existing heater. The mockup also verified the size of the thermostat saddles that would 
be needed for installation. The DSCOVR Mechanical Team performed a structural analysis of the design and 
concluded it was acceptable for flight. 
 After this plan was approved for flight, the blanketing over line zone 5 was opened and removed, and the new 
thermostats and line heater were installed. The wiring for the auxiliary heater was spliced into existing hardware. A 
special powered test during a Comprehensive Performance Test for the spacecraft verified that the heater cycled 
appropriately by cooling that specific location on the spacecraft. Finally, the blanketing was re-installed on the thermal 
zone in preparation for flight. Post-launch, the auxiliary heater is performing nominally. 
7. Command Verification Testing 
 During command verification testing at the launch site, a Propulsion EGSE connector was connected to DSCOVR 
in anticipation of later use. When the command was sent from the Integration and Testing Operation Software (ITOS) 
workstation to close the latch valve, the latch valve did not respond. The latch valve was successfully commanded 
closed only after the EGSE connector was disconnected from the spacecraft. The conclusion of the investigation was 
that the diodes inside the solid state relays in the Propulsion EGSE cards allowed the voltage being supplied to close 
the latch valve to be fed back into the EGSE power supply. The lesson learned from this issue is to fully understand 
the electrical testing configuration with flight hardware and potential issues with equipment. In addition, previous 
command verification tests did not include the EGSE connected to the spacecraft. Testing configurations should be 
consistent each time they are performed, unless there is a technical reason to change the test setup.  
VI. Conclusion 
 Despite unique challenges posed by a resurrected spacecraft, the DSCOVR propulsion system was successfully 
refurbished and tested by the GSFC Propulsion Team.  DSCOVR is currently on its journey to L1; the propulsion 
system is performing nominally and showing no signs of degradation, even after 10 years in storage.  
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